2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-9-2013

USA v. John Hughes, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"USA v. John Hughes, Jr." (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1413.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1413

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-1301
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN J. HUGHES, JR.,
Appellant
_____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-10-cr-00190-001)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 07, 2013
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: January 9, 2013)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a criminal trial in which Defendant John Hughes, Jr. was
found guilty of one count of conspiracy to use fire to commit a federal felony and
interstate transportation of stolen property and one count of interstate transportation of

stolen property. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment of conviction
and sentence.
I.
On June 16, 2010, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned a
three-count indictment naming Hughes and a co-conspirator, Angel Rodriguez. The
indictment charged both with (1) conspiracy to commit arson and interstate transportation
of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
844(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) interstate transportation of stolen property in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (App. 26a-29a.) Hughes entered a plea of “not
guilty” to each of the three charges on June 22, 2010; Rodriguez entered a plea of not
guilty on July 13, 2010.
On January 19, 2011, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, again
naming Hughes and Rodriguez as defendants and charging both with three crimes. (App.
30a.) Count I of the superseding indictment charged both with conspiracy to use fire to
commit a federal felony and interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371; Count II charged both with use of fire to commit a federal felony in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and Count III charged both with
interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C.
§2. (App. 30a-33a.) On February 22, 2011, Rodriguez entered a plea of guilty to a single
count of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Hughes, on the other hand, elected to
go to trial on all three counts pending against him. On August 3, 2011, Hughes was
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convicted by a jury on Counts I and III of the superseding indictment, and acquitted on
Count II.
At sentencing on January 24, 2012, Hughes argued that he was entitled to credit
for acceptance of responsibility under the Guidelines because he had only contested the
counts related to arson, and that he accepted responsibility for the acts underlying the
theft counts. The District Court denied his request, noting that “[a]t trial, [Defendant]
noted to the jury that he was going to accept responsibility for the thefts, but he never
pled guilty to anything. He took the case to trial and decided that he was going to roll the
dice. I see no acceptance.” (App. 927a; see also App. 912a-927a.) Ultimately, Hughes
was sentenced to a term of 180 months’ imprisonment. Rodriguez was sentenced to 60
months’ imprisonment.
Hughes presents three issues on appeal: (1) that the use-of-fire object of the
conspiracy count should have been dismissed; (2) that he should have been given credit
for acceptance of responsibility; and (3) that his sentence was excessive and substantively
unreasonable. We will address each argument in turn.
II.
A. Superseding Indictment
Hughes argues that Count I of the superseding indictment – conspiracy to use fire
to commit a federal felony and interstate transportation of stolen property – should have
been dismissed. Count I lists two objects, including the use of fire to commit a federal
felony. The superseding indictment does not specifically say what “federal felony”
constituted the underlying offense, however, and he argues that it could be “any number
3

of offenses” and that the indictment “failed to apprise [him] of what he need[ed] to be
prepared to meet.” (Br. at 15.) Thus, Hughes argues that Count I should have been
dismissed. His argument fails.
This Court has plenary review of the sufficiency of the allegations contained in an
indictment. United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). An indictment must
set forth the elements of an alleged crime with “sufficient factual orientation” to allow a
defendant to prepare an adequate defense. See id. at 596. We find that the superseding
indictment at the very least provided Hughes with sufficient notice as to the elements of
the alleged crime such that the Hughes knew and could prepare for the allegations he
would have to defend.
The elements of a charge of conspiracy are (1) a unity of purpose between the
alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to
work together toward that goal. United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). The superseding
indictment named the co-conspirators and set forth the two objects of the conspiracy:
profiting from the sale of stolen property and concealment of the theft of property
through setting a fire at a specific location. (App. 30a.) Furthermore, the superseding
indictment specifies the overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) that the coconspirators stole property and inventory from the victim, Americana, and (2) that
Hughes directed his co-conspirator to set fire to Americana’s building. (App. 31a.) In
other words, the charge explicitly stated that Hughes conspired to use the setting of a fire
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in furtherance of the felonious conspiracy and the felonious transportation of stolen
property across state lines.
As the superseding indictment adequately gave Hughes notice of the elements of
the crime he was charged with committing, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of
Hughes’s motion to dismiss Count I of the superseding indictment.
B. Acceptance of Responsibility
Hughes further argues that because the use-of-fire object of the conspiracy should
be vacated, he actually accepted responsibility for his actions as to all allegations for
which he was convicted, and is therefore entitled to credit for acceptance of responsibility
under the Guidelines. As discussed above, this Court does not find that the use-of-fire
object of the conspiracy must be vacated. Furthermore, we do not find that the District
Court’s denial of his request for credit for acceptance of responsibility was clearly
erroneous. A district court’s determination as to a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines is “entitled to great deference on
review” and “may be reversed only if ‘clearly erroneous.’” United States v. Singh, 923
F.2d 1039, 1043 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (commentary) (application
note 5)). Although conviction by trial does not preclude downward departure for
acceptance of responsibility, United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2008),
the district court is in no way obligated to grant downward departure. Accordingly, we
will affirm the District Court’s refusal to grant Hughes credit for acceptance of
responsibility.
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C. Reasonableness of the Sentence
Finally, we address Hughes’s argument that the disparity between his sentence and
that of his co-conspirator rendered his sentence substantively unreasonable. (App. 932a937a.) The procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hughes to a term
of imprisonment significantly longer than that of Rodriguez. As the record shows, the
District Court compared the relevant facts pertaining to Hughes and Rodriguez, including
the crimes for which they were convicted, their respective roles in the conspiracy, the
level of cooperation they offered to the government, and other background facts. (App.
942a-943a.) The record reflects the District Court’s rational and meaningful
consideration of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and therefore, we will affirm the
District Court’s imposition of Hughes’s sentence.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and the
sentence imposed by the District Court.
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